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Article 5

Book Reviews
Figures of Literary Discourse, by Gerard Genette, translated by Alan Sheridan,
Introduction by Marie-Rose Logan. New York: Columbia University Press,
1982. Pp. xix + 303. $20.00.
Figures of Literary Discourse is a selection of eleven essays published by Gerard Genette between 1961 and 1970 (the structuralist decade) and collected
in his Figures (and not Figures I, as the Introduction to the English translation, the blurb and even the back of the title page call it!), Figures II and Figures III. Several of the essays-"Principles of Pure Criticism," for instance,
"Frontiers of Narrative/' "Proust Palimpsest" -are considered classics of literary structuralism; most of them had not, to my knowledge, been translated in English (one exception is "Frontieres du recit/' translated as
"Boundaries of Narrative" by Ann Levonas and published in 1976 in New
Literary History); and all of them are representative, substantial and thoughtprovoking. The essays are preceded by a good Introduction in which MarieRose Logan identifies their main thrust-Oto combine a systematic approach
to the study of literature with a questioning that exceeds the boundaries of a
given system" -and suggests an interesting comparison between Genette's
rethinking of poetics and Derrida's rethinking of philosophy. The translation by Alan Sheridan is more than adequate though it is marred by too
many misprints (I have counted over 30) and though it is not always felicitous (I do not think, for example, that gap, in "Poetic Language, Poetics of
Language," is an appropriate translation of ecart: deviation or one of its synonyms would be better; and I think that, on p. 167, it needed the device is a
poor rendition of il a fallu La trouvaille).
The essays are not arranged chronologically. Rather, as Logan points out,
lithe order of presentation adopted follows the traditional distinction between theory [the seven essays constituting Part I] and practice [the four essays constituting Part II]" even though "a rigid distinction between
theoretical and practical criticisms does not apply to Genette's work." Perhaps it could be said that they go from the more general to the more specific. "Structuralism and Literary Criticism" describes the latter as a kind of
bricolage, locates the structuralist method between pure formalism and traditional realism, and charts the domains in which an explicitly structuralist
criticism might prove fruitful, irrelevant or illegitimate. liThe Obverse of
Signs" continues the examination of the structuralist domain and gesture by
focusing on Barthes's semiological project and its attention to the phenomena and techniques of connotation; it shows how structuralist criticism both
"deciphers and constitutes the intelligible" and how (Barthes's) semiological activity belongs not only to an epistemological order but also to a criticoethical one. "Figures" defines the figure as the form of the gap or space
''between the letter and the meaning, between what the poet has written and
what he thought," between the signifier and the signified; such gaps or
spaces and the systems they form constitute a privileged area of investigation for structuralist criticism. "Principles of Pure Criticism" makes use of
Thibaudet's Pltysiologie de la critique to outline the three major areas that a
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criticism concerned with essences (a structuralist one!) would study: that absence of the subject that we call "writer"; the structures of literary discourse;
and the very notions of Book, text, writing. uPoetic Language, Poetics of
Language" characterizes the fundamental thrust of literature as the attempt
to reduce or close the gap constituting language itself-the gap between signifier and signified-and points to the necessity of studying systematically
"the innumerable forms of linguistic imagination." "Rhetoric Restrained"
traces the gradual restriction of the rhetorical field, bemoans the rise of metaphor as the trope of all tropes, and argues for the construction of a "new
rhetoric," a semiotics of all discourses. "Frontiers of narrative" shows how
narrative constitutes itself in terms of three major polarities (diegesis/
mimesis; narration/description; story/discourse). After having thus discussed the nature of structuralist criticism and charted its domain and some
of its sub-domains, Figures of Literary Discourse turns to more specific structuralist demonstrations. " 'Stendhal' " argues that the essence of Stendhalian
activity is "a constant and exemplary transgression of the limits, rules, and
functions that apparently make up the literary game" (who is the author?
what is a work?). "Flaubert's Silences" studies the moments in which Flaubert's narrative escapes meaning and concludes that literature itself is a
"death" of language. "Proust Palimpsest" shows that the Recherche is constituted by the ceaseless merging and entanglement of figures and meanings,
decipherable only "in their inextricable totality." Finally, "Proust and Indirect Language" finds that, for Proust like for Mallarme (and for Genette), literature is a secondary, indirect language trying to make up for the
"shortcomings" of our "primary" language.
Taken together, the eleven essays constitute an excellent introduction to
(or reminder of) structuralist poetics, its major concerns and ambitions, its
fundamental stance and methods, its privileged references. Structuralism in
literature (and elsewhere!) is essentially interested in making sense of sensemaking and attempts to build a coherent and systematic account of literary
signification. It considers literature (or the literary text) as a language to be
studied formally. It has faith in "objective" criteria, values structure as an
explanatory category at the expense of substance and pays particular attention to what in a text reveals the text's own view of language, communication and meaning. It regards linguistics (rather than history, sociology,
psychoanalysis, or philosophy) as the discipline to imitate and emulate. Like
a good defense et illustration of structuralism, the essays also testify to its rigor
(it consistently favors strict homologies and successfully resists ideological
biases in the analysis of structure), its suppleness (if it is against the fetishism of the author, it is also against the fetishism of the work; it reminds us
that, strictly speaking, there is no literary object but only a literary function;
it makes ample room for the reader reading), and its many contributions (to
poetic theory and narratology, to the study of connotation, to the view of literature as a self-signifying system and a rhetoric of silence, to the analysis of
meaning as form). Lastly, the essays are exemplary of Genette's own manner
and interests. They bring out his originality, his erudition, his easy precision, and his capacity to be scientific without scientism. They also put in relief his understanding of rhetoric as a system and as a code of literary
connotations, his belief that writing is the very locus of the true critic's
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thought, and his fascination for what in a text transgresses the laws of the
literary system. In fact, the seeds of much of Genette's subsequent work can
be found in this collection: Narrative Discourse (in "Frontiers of Narrative"
and the two pieces on Proust); Mimologiques (in "Poetic Language, Poetics of
Language"); Introduction l'architexte (in the various discussions of the nature and structure of literary discourse); and the recent Pali111psestes (in the
repeated considerations of text as palimpsest). Figures of Literary Discourse is a
superb structuralist performance.

a

University of Pennsylvania

Gerald Prince

The Narrative Act; Point of View in Prose Fiction by Susan Sniader Lanser.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981. Pp. x + 308. $21.00.
Susan Lanser undertakes an ambitious twofold project in this book. She
seeks, first, to develop a descriptive poetics of point of view and, second, to
demonstrate how her descriptive schema can lead one to firm conclusions
about the connection between narrative technique and ideology. Lanser has
more success with the first part of her project than with the second, but that
success is significant enough to make The Narrative Act a useful contribution
to narrative theory.
Lanser devotes her first two chapters to an assessment of previous point of
view studies and to an exposition of her own theoretical commitments. She
argues that, in spite of their notable successes, previous students of point of
view have generally conceived of the concept too narrowly (leaving out, for
example, the importance of a narrator's sex) and have divorced their analyses from considerations of ideology. To move beyond these perceived shortcomings Lanser adopts two fundamental principles: (1) fictional narratives
should be analyzed as speech acts; and (2) the aesthetic structures of a text
reflect its ideological content.
In the next two chapters, Lanser develops the consequences of these principles for her descriptive poetics. She begins with a sensible, though overly
long, discussion of the chains of authority, both diegetic and mimetic, existing among the various possible voices of a text. The diegetic chain moves
from the authorial or "extra fictional" voice as most authoritative, through
the voices of the public narrator and the private narrator (the first addresses
the reader, the second another character), down to the voice of the focalizer
as the least authoritative. The mimetic chain moves in the reverse order. In
turning to the poetics proper, Lanser follows her speech act modeJ and develops a broad conception of point of view, one based on three key relationships between the narrator and the narrative act. Sta/lis refers to "the
authority, competence, and credibility" (p. 86) a narrator is granted. COlllael
refers to the relationship the narrator establishes \vith the audience. 51011(('
refers to the relationship the narrator adopts tmvard the narrative itself.
Each of these three relationships, Lanser explains, is itself the product of
several other elements of narrative technique.
Status is determined by (1) the narrator's diegetic authority, v·:hich in turn
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is determined by his or her social identity (sex, race, class, etc.), and by (2)
the narrator's mimetic authority, which in turn is determined by the honesty, reliability, and competence of the narration. Contact is determined by
(1) the mode (or directness) of the communication between narrator and audience ("I-you" at one extreme; no first or second person pronouns at the
other), by (2) the attitude of the narrator, including such variables as selfconfidence, self-consciousness, deference, and formality, and by (3) the
identity of the narratee. Stance is determined by a combination of four different kinds of stance: phraseological, spatial-temporal, psychological, and
ideological. In her discussion of each variable, Lanser tries to locate a degree-zero or unmarked case along a spectrum of possibilities; she also
stresses that each text establishes its own rules and that a narrator's profile
can alter during the course of his or her narration.
In Chapter S, Lanser explains how one can move from the description of
technique to the discovery of ideology. The surface structure speech acts
will reveal the narrator's status, contact, and stance, and these elements will,
in turn, reveal the narrator's values and norms for social behavior, especially communication. Comparing these beliefs with the dominant beliefs of
the "culture text" will complete the portrait of the narrator. At this point,
one can make the final connection between technique and ideology by examining how the point of view reflects the text's ideological content. In
Chapter 6, Lanser illustrates this process of discovery with analyses of Chopin's "The Story of an Hour" and Hemingway's "The Killers." She concludes with some suggestions for other uses of her model (e.g., a history of
zero-degree conventions), and she adds an appendix suggesting that speech
act theory might properly treat literary speech acts as "hypotheticals/' a
class that would be parallel to rather than a deviation from other classes of
speech acts (representatives, directives, etc.).
Lanser's book is impressive for the knowledge of previous work on point
of view it demonstrates; more impressive still is the sound critical intelligence that enables her to unite the findings of such diverse critics as Gerard
Genette, Boris Uspensky, Mary Louise Pratt, Fernando Ferrara, Terry Eagleton, and Wayne Booth into her own coherent vision of point of view. The
chief virtue of that vision is that it combines depth and flexibility. Lanser
succeeds in offering a specific, detailed schema for developing a portrait of a
narrator while also showing that the system cannot be applied mechanically. Furthermore, Lanser emphasizes the important point that absences
from a text (e.g., Caddy's voice from The Sound and the Fury) can be as significant as presences.
Nevertheless, The Narrative Act suffers from some rhetorical and analytical
deficiencies. Much of the first four chapters, approximately two-thirds of
the whole, is exposition rather than argument; to the extent Lanser does
provide demonstration for her points, she employs brief illustrations from
texts, or more frequently, citations from the work of other critics. This mode
of procedure has three undesirable consequences: (1) it makes the book
seem more derivative than it is; (2) it makes certain sections, notably the
chapter on voice, seem labored or too long; and (3) it leaves almost every
conclusion vulnerable to those who have mustered arguments against Pratt
or Eagleton or Fowler or whoever her source happens to be. Furthermore,
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Lanser's method of presentation puts a heavy burden of demonstration on
her analyses of Chopin and Hemingway, and that burden proves too much
for them to bear.
Lanser's readings do show the descriptive poetics to good advantageamong other fine insights she offers a perceptive analysis of the narrator as
an "invisible eyewitness" in "The Killers" -but her conclusions about the
connection between ideology and technique are generally unconvincing.
Perhaps because "The Killers" is a more difficult case, the problems are especially evident in that analysis. After her careful description of the narrator, Lanser moves to ideology by giving the story a thematic reading-the
events "signal a loss of possibility, in this American small town, for a certain
kind of proof or assertion of manhood" (p. 274)-and then interpreting the
point of view in light of the theme-Nas the characters are unable or unwilling to act, to show feelings, to respond, so too the narrator refuses to accept
the full range of linguistic possibilities" (p. 274); refuses, in short, to act in
his sphere. This conclusion, I believe, is far too easy. Lanser's supple system
for describing point of view gets transformed into a crude instrument for
detecting ideology. The distinction between means and end is all but lost as
technique simply mirrors or reiterates ideological end, and Lanser forgets
that Hemingway stories with quite different ideological content, e.g., A
Clean, Well-Lighted Place," employ remarkably similar techniques. If space
permitted, I would try to show that Lanser's belief that "the novel's basic illocutionary activity is ideological instruction" (p. 293) leads her to misread
"The Killers" and misrepresent the effect of Hemingway's technique (the
horror of Ole Andreson's situation is what is central), but far more important is what her faulty analysis suggests about her project. It indicates that
one of her basic principles-aesthetic structures have a homologous relation
to ideological content-needs to be seriously rethought and even perhaps
rejected.
Although Lanser's book does not succeed at the ambitious task of connecting technique with ideology, her poetics of point of view will serve as a
valuable guide for others who want to pursue that connection-and as a
helpful system for those whose main concern is still technique itself.
II

Ohio State University

James Phelan

Five Frames for the Decameron: Communication and Social Systems in the Cornice
by Joy Hambeuchen Potter. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982. Pp.
+ 230. $20.00.

ix

Critical pronouncements of literary scholars could not be much more varied than those which have been generated, for at least the last hundred
years, by radically dissimilar readings of Boccaccio's Decamerol1. It is the one
work by the man from Certaldo which is most beloved by the general reader
and scholar alike, and yet is often shunned by scholars who cannot find a
cubby-hole in which to place it. The work defies confinement. The sharp
contrast between its modest claims and its highly literary structure, between

-----------------------------------------------------------~
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the gruesome description of the plague and that of the idyllic world of the
storytellers seems to destabilize the work's equilibrium. The discomfort of
scholars who are hard-pressed to explain the function and meaning of the
Decameron clashes violently with the nonchalance of the "author" who claims
that the book is not for scholars and that, while it may be instructive in
some small ways, it is not purposefully didactic.
Boccaccio's Decameron has been seen by its readers to be evolutionary, medieval, transitional, modern and even revolutionary. Now, by adding'to the
traditional arsenal of literary critics the newest weapons acquired through
the communicational disciplines (semiotics, sociology, and cultural anthropology), Joy Hambeuchen Potter leads the hunt for meaning in the Decameron in a promising new direction.
Armed with Erving Goffman's "frame analysis" techniques, Victor Turner's notion of liminal phenomena, Mary Douglas's "symbolistics," and a semiotic compass, Potter begins her search by examining the idea of framing
in the Decameron in terms of ritual. The discovery, for which she gives a cautious argument which is burdened at times by an excess of "could"s and
"might"s, is that the Decameron thrives on its ambiguity and its self-subverting nature. It is an intermediary of sorts (as the book's subtitle suggests) between the liminal world of the frame tale protagonists and that of the
reader. In it "telling" and "reading" become rites of passage whereby the
rules of ritual and the "grammar" of societal values are transmitted to teller
and reader alike. The very literariness of the Decameron, paradoxically,
serves to point to the prime importance of its social function as a training
manual and mirror of institutional crisis. Boccaccio's style is itself a metastatement on his seriousness of purpose, and the text is witness to his civicmindedness and intolerance of institutions (especially the church) which
are failing to fulfill their proper social function. One comes away, in the
end, with a vision of a work which reflects not only the crisis of a society in
transition (which others have conjured up before), but also its author's acute
awareness of the dimensions of that crisis.
Potter argues that "Boccaccio carefully sets up his work in five major overt
frames, but he weakens his own structure by stepping in and out from one
to the other. .. " (p. 122). She, in effect, decontructs the false critical dualism
which surrounds the text ("Boccaccio the Escapist" vs "Boccaccio the realist") by showing how Boccaccio's subversion of his own elaborate frame systems obscures the boundaries between fiction and reality and between the
fictional tellers and the "real" reader. The only potential flaw in the argument concerns the central issue of the ambiguity of the Decameron. Potter is
well aware of the importance of lying in the text and even quotes Umberto
Eco on the intimate bond between semiosis and lying, yet some of the Decameron's enunciations, especially on the "nature of women," are accepted at
face value in a surprisingly uncritical manner.
This study of Boccaccio's Decameron is refreshing, exciting and important.
Those readers who find the style of current criticism to be less than limpid
will find here a thoroughly readable book which, in spite of its readability,
makes a significant contribution to Italian studies in general and to Boccaccio studies in particular.
Wayne State University

Andrea di Tommaso
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Alexander Pope and the Traditions of Formal Verse Satire by Howard Weinbrot,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982. Pp. vii + 388. $35.00.
Howard Weinbrot has written a learned book on an interesting aspect of
the Popeian poetic, and his announced intention is to correct two "misleading assumptions regarding Pope .... The first is that his career is 'progressively an Imitatio Horatii,' and the second is that 'Horatianism and
Augustanism are definitive of the age"' (p. 3). At very substantial length
these propositions are revealed as impostures, requiring the necessary
corrective that the "direction of Pope's career as a formal verse satirist is
from an essentially Horatian ethic epistle like Burlington (1731), to mingled
satire with a variety of Horatian, Juvenalian, and Persian emphases, to the
overwhelmingly Juvenalian-Persian elevation and gloom of the Epilogue to
the Satires (1738)" (p. 331).
Much of the first half of the book is given over to historical inquiry into
classical and modern (English and French) satire, and particular attention is
paid to Juvenalian conventions in the earlier sixteenth and later seventeenth centuries, to such topics as the sublime and the Juvenalian correspondence, and to the political inadequacy of Horatianism for opposition
writers in England after 1688. Weinbrot's political assessment of the relative
utility of Horace and Juvenal to Pope leads him also into a lengthy discussion of "the classical satirists and their relationships with their own rulers"
(p. 44) in the course of which he argues that "Lucilius anticipated and
shared the political and satiric severity of Persius and Juvenal," whereas
Horace, "more accepting of his age ... had the good fortune to live when a
poet, prime minister, and prince were on amiable terms" (pp. 50-51). The
entire commentary lucidly establishes Pope's perception of his own political
situation and the urgencies that rendered Juvenal a more valuable (and necessary) satiric model as Pope's own dubieties about Walpole and the age
deepened in his later years.
In his chapter on "Roman Modes of Proceeding," Weinbrot notes the "variety of related satiric conventions" ("disguise, dialogue, the nature of the
adversary, and irony") that Roman satire made available to Pope (p. 65). The
author moves easily and well between classical and modern modes, stating
that "one of Boileau's essential satiric techniques ... is the mingling of the
varied conventions of his Latin predecessors while exercising his own original genius" (p. 96). Much the same sort of insight into Pope's later satires is
offered in the remark that Pope's "The Fourth Satire of Dr. John Donne.
Versifyed" begins "with a Horatian framework already modified by the Persian and Juvenalian urgings of the Renaissance," while adding "Pope's own
level of attack upon the specific aberrations of Sir Robert's court" (p. 307).
All of this is very much to the good, necessary and useful. My own dubiety about the work arises when Weinbrot turns to consider at length the
First Satire of the Second Book of Horace Imitated and the Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot.
The positioning of these works within the study (pp. 201-75) and the long
discussion given over to them clearly suggest their importance to him. Yet I
find these pages somewhat disappointing because of the relentless focus
upon the single dimension of political experience that dominates the inquiry. Pope's use of language as a self-reflexive instrument, questions of
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theodicy, or the relation of these satires to themes and issues that permeate
Pope's other and earlier poetry-all of this is almost entirely absent, and we
are given over and again the view that Pope's "Juvenalian world," even in
1733, "is in decline, rotten at its political core, and no longer reliable at its
highest levels-monarch, minister, church, law, and trade are corrupt" (p.
238).
Much has been made in other quarters of the darkening of the Popeian
perspective as he moved into the middle years of the century's fourth decade. Weinbrot takes his own stand within the conviction that such works as
the Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot are "the penalty [Pope must pay] both for his own
eminence and for living after Gay's death in 1732, for that Hanoverian
world is characterized by, one may say, the slimy Bufo not the diminished
Atticus" (p. 257). Undoubtedly, but I am a little uneasy about a thesis so often reiterated and made the entire and single basis for the movement from
Horatian to Juvenalian modes. Perhaps too often Pope is established as a figure single-mindedly and exclusively in the service of a noble cause, as
tho:ugh the poet is without doubt about himself or his vocation, and the text
without any evidence of a subtle and self-searching individuality, without
bearing on the poet in the context of his own vanity or weakness. Thus, of
the Arbuthnot: "Once we reach Sporus, Pope is seen as a member of the characteristically embattled and shrinking minority, a citizen of a nation corrupt
at its highest levels and hence further corrupted by subservient imitators"
(p. 261). It is therefore that the "finally un-Horatian Arbuthnot may be seen
more clearly when it is set against the more Horatian Epistle to Bathurst (p.
269). Yet the un-Horatian Arbuthnot ends with a blessing; the more Horatian
Bathurst ends with a curse and a death. Is it really effective to argue that in
the latter the devil can be treated with "amused contempt" (p. 269), and
does Weinbrot really mean to suggest radical distinctions in Pope's beliefs
and convictions in works composed so closely together? And what is gained
or proven by arguing that the "tenuous but finally positive world of Arbuthnot ends with the word 'Heav'n'; the declining Juvenalian world of the second satire of Donne versified ends with the word 'Law'lf (p. 302)? The
Twickenham editor reminds us that "The Second Satire was 'translated' for
the first Earl of Oxford-perhaps in 1713 .... When Pope revised the poem
in 1733, he retained only some 30 of the 120 and odd lines" (TE, IV:xlii). So
far so good, but the closing couplet of the far earlier version is similar to that
of the 1733 version and concludes with "Law." Declining world in 1713?
I find myself uneasy with the range of the criticism and, perhaps even
more importantly, with the claims implicit (and explicit) within it. Is there
truly anything remarkable in being told about the darkening mood of
Pope's later years? It is something he shares with Swift, and the despair (if
that word does not somewhat overstate the case) of both men is referable to
the familiar "gloom of the Tory satirists," the title of an essay Bredvold
wrote in 1949 which cites Joseph Warton on Pope's two Dialogues of 1738:
"The satire of these pieces is of the strongest kind; sometimes, direct and declamatory, at others, ironical and oblique." Admittedly Weinbrot does much
more than recognize the increasing inadequacy of the Horatian mode (invoked sometimes in Pope's later poetry as a Ulost norm" and at other times
as an "inadequate norm"). He quite convinces me that "Pope used Horace,
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Persius, and Juvenal in the proportion his occasion demanded" (p. 364). But
I might add that we have been long aware that Pope is one of the most assimilative and synthetic poets in the language, and I remain somewhat in
doubt about my response to a work that consistently overproves its one thesis: "The notion of Pope as an eighteenth-century Augustan Horace wants
reconsideration if we are to reclaim Pope's genuine achievements in satire"
(p.44).
By all means let us do so, but surely Pope's achievements are somewhat
more complex than the reconsideration of Pope as Augustan Horace can
provide. But even granting Weinbrot everything his thesis requires, there
are moments when he sends me rummaging back through his own and
Pope's text to discover precisely what point his commentary is making. "The
courteous epistle To a Lady is Pope's only Horatian poem to follow ArblltJlIlot
and its Pyrrhic victory. Thereafter, he would alternate or blend Horace with
the more severe tragic masks of Persius and Juvenal ... " (p. 275). Indeed,
but a few pages earlier we heard of the "mingled but finally un-Horatian

Arbuthnot," and as late as 1737/38 in the First Epistle of the First Book, "Horatianism here ekes out its slender victory because Bolingbroke is Pope's present model of good" (p. 298). If, however, Weinbrot gives us excellent reason
to reconsider the relation in Pope's later years between Horatian and Juvenalian contexts, he nevertheless does not convince me, on the basis of his
own limited engagement, that "Pope's comprehensive achievement [is] as
impressive in its way as Paradise Lost is in its" (p. 364). No one, I think, can
make this claim for Pope without demonstrating the integrity of his "composite art" (p. 364) as it extends throughout the canon. If, then, I admire the
careful and searching historical intelligence on display in these pages, I also
find myself wanting a criticism both more daring and more demanding,
more multi-dimensional and thereby more appropriate to the totality of
Pope's vision.

Duke University

Wallace Jackson

The Holy and the Daemonic from Sir Thomas Browne to \Villiam Blake by R. D.
Stock. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1982. Pp. ix + 395. $27.50.
A religious purpose so suffuses much of literature that few poets would
admit to being entirely skeptical and secular, to having experienced no
sense of awe at the universe or at the very fact of being. \'Vho \ .... ould admit
not even aspiring to nobility of mind? For a poet to be worthy of the name
with the glories attendant on it, he ought in good faith to marvel at the
works of the Maker, or at the ecstatic inflations of the released spirit. Somewhere wonder enters; without it, who writcs-a stone? a clod? Allusions to
the Bible and to subsidiarv occult traditions have left little need to pnwe
that much of the work of Herbert, Donne, Shakespeare, Milton, Blake, and
others have religious undertones or echoes, and rarely does somC(lne argue
otherwise. Indeed. religion and literature have been cl(lsel~' allied as parallel sources of spiritual \,'isdom and personal fulfillnlCnt since the Grl~eL~.
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and in earliest tribal times one was a function of the other. Trembling, shuddering, mystery, awe-these were experiences variously provoked and variously described, often beyond the gropings of language to convey, whether
the experience arose once in a lifetime Of in a regular sequence of worship.
The venerable Rudolf Otto knew that the Numinous was everywhere,
arousing here a sense of humility and terror, there a sense of power and enthusiasm, always a recognition of forces wholly Other beyond the quotidien. Otto recorded those glimpses in the workings of the magician, of the
oriental mediator, as well as of the Christian; in his footsteps Mircea Eliade
located the precincts of the sacred in the dancing grounds of the shaman, as
well as in the alchemist's vial. Who is to say which holiness is the holiest,
which universe is the most sacralized, which hill the most radiant with
mana? The Holy is not a prescribed rite or an ethical program but an invisible dimension of human experience made visible in shrines, artifacts, works
of literature, and other traces of numinous visitations.
The term "Daemonism" is not as inclusive, being a manifestation of the
Holy in guardian spirits or in personal energy, but it, too, in its original
meaning involves no judgment. Information about pre-Christian Greek and
Celtic Daemons is readily available in encyclopedias of religion, in E. R.
Dodds's many works, and in literary studies of Daemonism such as those by
Charles 1. Patterson. The ethicizing of the Daemon comes with the banishment of the pagan gods who are metamorphozed into demons, forced
henceforward to exercise their passions subversively.
As used in the book under review, however, both these terms contract
into a narrow sphere. Otto's 1923 Idea of the Holy is the touchstone (with no
mention of Eliade, Gerard Van Der Leeuw, or later commentators) but Otto's
inclusion of a broad range of comparative religious experience is here ignored; here the holy resides alone in a precarious balance of reason and
faith most effectively achieved in the mid-seventeenth century by Thomas
Browne and John Dryden. In choosing to find Job "the locus classicus of the
experience of the Holy" (p. 17) Stock emphasizes the abasement of the worshipper, not his enthusiastic glory, and this emphasis determines the choice
of works. "Daemon ism" is used also in its narrow Judeo-Christian not its
wider Greek or Celtic sense. The "mysterious, energetic, non-rationat nonmoral" quality of Daemons is rightly asserted on page 19, but thereafter the
word, like a hiss on the burning lake, applies to devilishness r'daemonic
impulsions of man" [po 246], "truly daemonic pursuit of Clarissa" [po 274],
"daemonic formula" [po 343], "daemonic horror" [po 365] and to real life
witches, whom the author hints may be necessary to a belief in the Holy and
in the reality of evil according to the principle uno spirit, no god" (pp.
96-7). Major contributions to the study of the daemonic such as Frances
Yates's, D. P. Walker's, and Keith Thomas's need to be dealt with thoroughly, not footnoted to corroborate minor points (though Yates is not mentioned anywhere). On the subject of eighteenth century demons Coleman O.
Parsons's Witchcraft and Demonology in Scott's Fiction, which covers the whole
field, not just Scott, would be useful.
Within the confines of the terms as used, the book moves chronologically
through a series of writers, often curiously grouped, assessing first their
sense of the Holy, then their concern with the Daemonic. John Donne and
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Job exhibit the correct sense of the Holy in their attacks on human pride.
Thomas Brownel Drydenl and Pascal walk the line between extremes that
are explained like this: "The defenders of religion can be classed as follows.
There were the Deistsl who attempted to ground religion on reason. At best
a shivery compromise with rationalisml Deism failed to flourish and was
moribund by the middle of the eighteenth century. Opposing the Deists
were Fideists, for whoml despairing altogether of reasonl supernatural revelation and dogma were the foundations of faith. But Fideism is a radical position as close to skepticism as Deism to rationalismu (p. 24). This
explanation is typical of the level of theological discernment in the book.
Browne preserves his balance by paradox; Dryden by keeping to "the middle way" of Anglicanism and Roman Catholicismu (p. 42) because lithe
ideas of salvation and redemption-concepts quite incomprehensible and
even idiotic to the non-religious or rationalist sensibility-are fundamental
to any numinous or transcendental faith" (p. 40); and Pascal by
"mimic[king] the unspeakable hopelessness of the infidel" (p. 46). Sometimes an authorls sense of the Holy is found to be meagrel as in the cases of
Pope (p. 130) and Swift (pp. 147, 150), but they nevertheless show a fugitive
interest in images of the daemonic, as in Eloisa's IIdaemonic dream/lor
Swift's Tale of the Tub. One wonders why they were included under the
Holy at all. Watts, Akenside, Thomson, and Young, are rushed together because they were IIforging an aesthetic of the numinous" (p. 162). Evidence is
found for their interest in the eery, the dark, the gloomy, and the horrible.
In a typically vague analysisl Young is praised for his resemblance to Pascal:
And I will make two further points. However inferior Yoting is as a poet to
Pope, he is truer to my sense of Pascal: the disjointed observationsl the violent antitheses . .. seem closer to the Pensees than Pope's couplets. I also
think that the Pascalian view runs more consistently through Young's gargantuan work than through Pope's poem" (p. 194). The chapters on "Spiritual Horror in the Novel: Richardsonl Radcliffel Beckfordl LewisII and on
"Religious Love and Fear in Late Century Poetry: Smartl Wesley, Cowper,
Blake" continue the search for the Numinous as a shudder of supernatural
horror, and the daemonic as a haunted world of madness. Much plot summary, tenuous evidence of daemonism, and impressionistic e'I feel" "he
must have thought") interpretations clog the progress. The chapter on the
Gothic concludes, "Between titillation and spiritual exercise, after alt there
is but a wavering line" (p. 313). The chapter on the "mad" religious poets
ends by dismissing Blake in the words of Paul Elmer More writing in 1911
(p.372).
The best sections of the book are the chapter on "The Debate over Witchcraft and Miracles in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," rich in
historical and polemical lore, especially on Casaubon, Glanvil, and Conyers
Middleton, a brief section on Defoels recognition of supernatural guidance
in Robinson Crusoe, and a fine chapter on Johnson and Hume, with Hume's
arguments presented and rebutted clearlYI with a certain admiration of
Hume shining through the rebuke of Hume's "Puerile diatribes" and '~ois_
terous loathing."
Unfortunately, there are demons in the book that are not part of the daemonic content; these demons are the Others, those critics, often anonymous,
/I

II
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with whom the author disagrees. The book bristles with graceless attacks on
individual critics, such as Theodore Besterman (p. 58), F. R. Leavis (p. 153),
A. O. Lovejoy (p. 245, note), Northrop Frye (p. 347), and on critics generally,
growled out with the revulsion of Gogo's insult "CrritiC!" in Waiting for
Codal. For example, "a nea-sophist or positivist may pooh-pooh the intuitions as epistemologically inane, but others will respond that nothing is
more irrational than to dismiss such immediate and vivid experiences as
empty ... " (p. 25); or, "I should like again to argue, in passing, that the impact of that new theory on the seventeenth century mind has been magnified out of proper proportion by the typical historian of ideas, who trots it
out wearisomely, unimaginatively, to explain the intellectual perturbations
of the last three centuries" (p. 31); "less intrepid are some of the modern
scholars and soi-disant champions of Voltaire, who feel that they too must
give Pascal a kick to evince, I suppose, their fealty to the master" (p. 57).
Neo-sophists, typical historians of ideas, soi-disant champions of Voltaire, are
lined up against the wall with Whigs and Marxists: "I wish to decry a tendency in whig scholars to label Browne, Dryden, and Pascal Fideists, and
hence to dismiss them more easily as reactionaries trying to slink away from
the skeptical implications of the new philosophy" (p. 59). In his discussion
of Eloise to Abelard the very word "synthesized" provokes this outburst:
"This interpretation is as gratifying to the Marxian or Hegelian critic as the
other is to the sentimentalist" (p. 136). This brief sneer is transformed on the
last page of the book into the following: "Earlier in this study I stressed the
difference between the Christian, and the Hegelian or Marxian, understanding of Eloisa to Abelard. This is the same difference, on a cosmic scale" (p.
385).
Rarely specified after 1950, critics take it on the chin: The Dunciad's "commentators have too often emulated the dull critic in the poem itself" (p.
139); "Swift's personality strikes some people as too prickly, and his attitude
toward his church, they say, is that of a bureaucrat or politician instead of a
priest. Swift was wholly cynical, they may go on to allege, but like a good
Pyrrhonist he supported Christianity as an anodyne for the mobile vulgus.
But this is the telepathic school of criticism, which I mistrust" (pp. 146-7).
Who are these "they"? We must be telepathists to know, for the footnote
gives us only critics who argue "for the compatibility of Swift's writings and
orthodox Christianity" (p. 147, note 22). On the same theme: "Swift has told
us persistently that he is satirizing abuses of religious thought, not the
thought itself; but critics, as persistently, disregard him: the dull ones because the satire is too intricate for them, the sophisticated ones because they
are always trying to 'see through' the satire to some underlying and congenial nihilism" (p. 156). Proponents of modern poets (p. 164), of james
joyce (p. 190), of Blake (p. 346), "most modern scholars" (p. 216), "academics" (p. 225), "innocent johnsonians" (p. 231), skeptics and cynics (p. 275) "a
chorus of modern exegetes" (p. 346), and "witless" critics (p. 376), culminate
in a furious rampage of "robotic naturalists" (p. 378), whigs and spiritists (p.
379), behaviorists, environmentalists, egalitarians, Marxists (p. 380), and
Gnostics (p. 382), all routed like Satan's fallen army, even as the author
promises that he himself will "try to repel the allure of egregious ax-grinding" (p. 203). The jeremiad in "Epilogue: The Next Stage" is too long and
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jumbled to quote, the enemies surrounding the writer too busy, for "seldom
has the smorgasbord of placebos been more depressingly copious" (p. 380).
Stock's bias is never far from the surface, as on pp. 66,201,256-7, but here
the apologetics, with calls for help from C. S. Lewis, who is too dignified to
answer, becomes hysterical.
Stock not only disdains his predecessors on the sacred ground before him
but even the initiates he is hoping to instruct. He is not writing for the critic
of the last twenty years, whose name he would not mention and whose
work he has not read, nor for "the tyro for whom Thomas Browne is an unknown personage and Deist an esoteric term" (p. 7); (we see how much the
tyro learns about the Deist from the quotation from page 24 noted above).
He mystifies the poor "tyro" by a combination of simplistic religious definitions and outlandish vocabulary such as the phrase "banaustic orrery" (p.
199), resulting in a style often tediously strained.
Four final suggestions: since the author states that Gnosticism is the worship of the snake (p. 157), I suggest he read Hans Jonas; since he can think of
no religious poetry since T. S. Eliot (p. 200), I suggest he look at Geoffrey
Hill's work; since he claims that Ernest Campbell Mossner writing in 1943 is
"Hume's most highly respected modern critic" (p. 202), I suggest he consult
some of the more recent Hume scholarship, such as that of Terence Penelhum, James Noxon, and Anthony Flew; and since he calls Blake's "two later
prophetic works, Milton and Jerusalem . .. but supplementary" (p. 370) I suggest he read them again, and the excellent recent criticism of Blake. The
wonder of the Holy, and the energy of the Daemonic, vanish as the author
defends a small beleagured terrain which he admits he floundered (p. 10) in
finding.

John Jay College of Criminal Justice
The City University of New York

Anya Taylor

D. H. Lawrence: History, Ideology and Fiction by Graham Holderness. Atlantic
Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1982. Pp. 248. $32.00.
Graham Holderness's claim that "all literary productions ... can be understood completely only by relating them to a historical and ideological
context" serves as the basis of his study of D. H. Lawrence. Holderness,
however, seems uninterested in understanding Lawrence's work completely, and thus his book only deals with those works of Lawrence "which
directly address his native society." Even here there are gaps: The Lost Girl is
barely mentioned, and Aaron's Rod is ignored altogether. Holderness's Marxist reading of Lawrence focuses on The White Peacock, The Trespasser, Sons and
Lovers, The Rainbow and Women in Love. Brief attention is also given to
"Odour of Chrysanthemums," "The Fox," and "Study of Thomas Hardy,"
and a coda-like chapter of eight pages is devoted to Lady Chatterley'S Lover.
Holderness is at his best when delineating the influence of the cultural attitudes of Aestheticism on Lawrence (the chapter on The Trespasser is especially impressive in this context) and when describing the Midlands mining
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society of the 1880s and 1890s. His chapter "History and Culture" shows
that the historical Eastwood of Lawrence's early youth differs significantly
from the writer's own descriptions in his novels and essays, and Holderness
also definitively clarifies the differences between the "butty system" and
the "little butty system" in which Lawrence's father was involved. Holderness is least impressive when he restricts the possibilities of interpretation
or allows his language to become excessively dogmatic. In his analysis of
Morel's cutting of William's hair in Sons and Lovers, he attacks Eliseo Vivas
for failing to recognize the social dimension of the conflict between husband and wife, but his insistence that "all the Morel quarrels are really social conflicts" rules out the multiple levels of psychological conflict
expressed in this novel. Holderness also argues that Lawrence's practical
programs of reform "are contradictory because they arise out of a contradictory analysis of human life in society/' but he refuses even to consider a
defense which suggests that Lawrence's use of key terms-including "mechanical" -is largely metaphorical rather than rooted in the practical.
Crucial to his attitude towards Lawrence's fiction is Holderness's use of
"realism," which is closely related to Georg Lukacs's use of the term. For
Holderness, "Lawrence's realism is always tragic," and tragedy is the
strength of his art. In his introduction, however, Holderness indicates that
he is not suggesting that "realism can claim a monopoly over the artistic
representation of reality, or that other artistic techniques, such as symbolism
and myth, are merely illusory fantasies," but by the time he comes to discuss
Lawrence's transcendence of realism in The Rainbow, he can only mourn the
loss of Lawrence's art. For Holderness, transcendence of realism is merely
the triumph of Lawrence's impulse to evade social tragedy, at the expense of
the conjunction of "individual life" and "actual history" found in "Odour of
Chrysanthemums" and the complexities and contradictions of social existence found in Sons and Lovers. As such, he can only view Lawrence's experiments in The Rainbow and in many of his later works as "ultimately sterile
and directionless."
This reviewer can appreciate Holderness's analysis of Lawrence's early
work in a meaningful historical context, but in no way can he agree with
the author's evaluation of The Rainbow and the "mythic" works of Lawrence's middle and late periods.
Wayne State University

Joseph Gomez

The Play of Faulkner's Language by John T. Matthews. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1982. Pp. 278. $19.50.
John T. Matthews' The Play of Faulkner's Language is a closely reasoned, exciting, and often illuminating book, but also a flawed one. Matthews' aim is
to read Faulkner's fiction through the enabling lens of Jacques Derrida's critique of the metaphysics of presence. This is an approach that has recently
begun to be used to good effect by a number of Faulkner critics, most notably by Stephen Ross in his deconstructions of the idea of voice in As I Lay
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Dying and Absalom, Absalom! (PMLA 94 [1979]: 300-310; Essays in Literature 8
[1981]: 135-49), and by Gail Morrison in her study of the motif of absence in
the major novels (Novel 14 [1981]: 232-50). No previous Derridean criticism
of Faulkner, though, approaches Matthews' in either scope or ambition, for
he is attempting nothing less than a full-scale redefinition of Faulkner's significance as an artist. Though Matthews discusses only The Sound and the
Fury, Absalom, Absalom!, The Hamlet, and Go Down, Moses in depth, his comments are clearly intended to apply to the canon as a whole and to create a
view of Faulkner as entirely-even relentlessly-committed to post-structuralist beliefs and fictional practices. This Faulkner believes that "there
may be no actuality or truth behind the texts' words that can be fully presented"; he "overthrows traditional ideas about the expressive prerogatives
of speech," believing instead that "language embodies consciousness, it
does not reveal it"; and he creates fictions whose entire meaning and value
reside in the "spirit of lively play" with which they greet the loss of authoritative truth, the center, the signified realm, the place of origin, innocence."
For readers of Faulkner raised on Brooks, Millgate, and Vickery, and accustomed to viewing him as a traditional moralist with modernist leanings,
these comments will seem strange indeed. That they will not (or should not)
seem merely preposterous is a measure both of the range and variety of
Faulkner's fiction and of Matthews' subtlety and acuity as a critic. In the
case of two at least of the four novels he considers, Matthews has much that
is new and enriching to say. His reading of Faulkner's unpublished 1933 introduction to The Sound and the Fury provides the first convincing explanation I have seen anywhere of the peculiar combination of exultation and
foreboding with which Faulkner recalled the writing of this seminal novel.
What Faulkner discovered in The Sound and the Fury, Matthews shows, is that
writing not only compensates for loss but initiates it. Because writing is
"supplementary," in Derrida's sense of the term, it necessarily defers the
sense of presence it intends to elicit; hence the "ecstasy" that Faulkner experienced when writing the novel is, like sexual climax, a form of selfcompletion that "simultaneously fulfills and exhausts itself." In his analysis
of the novel itself, Matthews shows how Faulkner extended his discovery of
the double movement inherent in writing to the various "languages"Benjy's relics, Quentin's memories, Jason's money-through which the
Compson males attempt to stave off their sense of loss. Especially admirable
is the challenge that Matthews mounts to the influential view, originating
with Jean Paul Sartre, of Quentin as a passive victim of the intrusive power
of memory. Matthews shows that even as Quentin is being overwhelmed by
memory he senses its supplementary status. Hence Quentin's suicide is as
much as result of the weakness of memory-of its inability to foster a truly
convincing illusion-as of its strength.
Similarly insightful is Matthews' reading of Absalom, Absalom! This novel,
very nearly a vade mecum for critics interested in self-reflexive fiction, responds particularly well to Matthews' Derridean method. Central to his
reading of it is another challenge to a prevailing belief, this time to the view
that Rosa Coldfield's and Mr. Compson's accounts of the 5utpen story are
little more than preludes to the supposedly authoritative narrative created
by Shreve and Quentin. This view, Matthews suggests, resembles Sutpen's
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innocent understanding of his own experience, in that it is based on a
"phallic, singly inseminated" conception of meaning. Matthews finds a
more appropriate model for our reading of the novel in Derrida's view of
meaning as a "hymeneal" play of repetition and variation across an infinite
field of signification. Armed with this model, Matthews is able to take
Rosa's and Mr. Campson's narratives more seriously than have most previous critics. He shows that Rosa's being is centered in the idea of continually deferred experience and traces the ways in which her highly-charged
language serves both to renew her desire and to guard against its satisfaction; and he provides an equally stimulating reading of the ways in which
Mr. Compson's interest in Sutpen's career originates in his sense of himself
as having been tragically displaced in time.
Many virtues to this book, then. But ranked against these virtues are several minor and two major flaws. The minor flaws are perhaps attributable to
the book's having originated as a dissertation: they consist of occasional
forced readings, of narrowness of intellectual and literary reference, and of
a slackening of argumentative energy and stylistic control in the book's
later stages. The major flaws are both versions of weaknesses that many people believe to be inherent in deconstructionist criticism. The first is that
Matthews' readings often impoverish Faulkner's text. Early on, Matthews
expresses the hope that this book will "temper the common assumption.
that Derrida's approach necessarily deadens the activity of reading." Unfortunately, when he moves away from The Sound and the Fury and Absalom,
Absalom! (and even sometimes when he is still discussing them), the effect of
Matthews' analyses is rather the opposite of what he intends. An example
from Go Down, Moses can serve to illustrate what I mean. Throughout his
discussion of this novel, Matthews emphasizes Ike McCaslin's role as reader
of the various "texts" provided him by plantation and wilderness. Ike's acts
of reading are of course a central concern of the novet and Matthews is to
be commended for elucidating many of the subtle interconnections among
them. Yet in deconstructing Ike's performance as a reader, Matthews deprives it of much of its artistic power. For him, Ike's acts of reading-and,
indeed, all of his experiences-are instances of repetition and reenactment,
not of discovery and growth. This orientation has the unfortunate effect of
deflecting Matthews' attention away from the centrally important issue of
when, why, and how Ike comes to know and to do what he does. In discussing "The Bear," for example, Matthews consistently acts as if knowledge of
L.Q.C. McCaslin's incest were readily available to Ike and to the other characters. Surely this is wrong. The fact of the matter is that no one-not Lucas
Beauchamp, not McCaslin Edmonds, not Zack or Roth Edmonds, not Ike
himself prior to his moment of insight-knows what Ike learns by reading
the ledgers. Significantly, this discovery occurs within a month of the
deaths of Old Ben and Sam Fathers. Like his observation of these deaths,
Ike's discovery of his grandfather's incest is a singular event in the irreversible sequence of his maturation. By instead treating it and its companion
events as if they were merely variant rereadings of an infinitely repeatable
text, Matthews deprives Faulkner's representation of Ike of one of its most
important dimensions.
The second major flaw is a relative of the first. Just as Matthews abstracts
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Ike McCaslin from his career in time, so does he also remove Faulkner from
his. Though Matthews organizes his discussion of the fiction chronologically, he does not trace lines of development, but instead presents the movement from novel to novel as if it were a more or less random alternation
among various languages of loss. Here again, the effect of his critical orientation is unfortunate. Surely Matthews is right to find anticipations of poststructuralist thought in Faulkner's fiction; but Faulkner was a transitional
figure, capable both of intuiting the illusory status of the dream of presence
and of yearning for a plenary fullness that was transcendentally grounded.
The tension between these two aspects of his thought becomes especially
acute in the second half of his career, when he senses a diminishment in his
creative power. As early as Go Down, Moses, in his depiction of the closure of
the wilderness, Faulkner writes a valedictory to the disappearance of his
sense of union with his artistic voice; and,in his later fiction, he searches repeatedly and somewhat desperately for ways to reconstitute his former
sense of artistic fullness. To ignore or deny this tension, as Matthews does,
is to rescue Faulkner from history in a diminishing way. And finally, I wonder whether Matthews' critical method would not itself have been strengthened by an acknowledgement of its implication in history. One need not
agree entirely with Fredric Jameson's contention that history is the untranscendable horizon of all discourse to think that deconstruction ism is no less
a creature of the moment than were earlier schools of criticism. In Matthews' disinclination to consider this possibility, one may perhaps detect a
desire for wholeness no less avid than the fictional ones he so assiduously
analyzes.
University of California, Davis

Karl F. Zender

A Reader's Guide to William Gaddis's "The Recognitions" by Steven Moore. lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1982. Pp. xii + 337. $25.00.

: I

William Gaddis's first novet The Recognitions, which Frank McConnell
considers "the indispensable novel of the last thirty years in America," was
published by Harcourt Brace & Co. in 1955 when the author was thirty-two
years old. With few exceptions, the reviews were inadequate or worse, suggesting that the reviewers were overwhelmed by the book's 956 page length
and puzzled by its extraordinary complexity. So too were the critics, for between 1955 and 1970 only one actual article appeared.
This unfortunate situation was reversed in the '70s as anti-realistic fiction
emerged from the underground to become a staple of contemporary American writing. The attention paid The Recogitiolls during that decade is indicative: several dissertations have been written on Gaddis alone or in
conjunction with John Barth, John Hawkes, Thomas Pynchon, and other
kindred spirits, and there has been a proliferation of published criticism by
such distinguished names as Thomas LeClair, David Madden, and Tony
Tanner. Gaddis's growing reputation has also been reflected in additional
ways. His second novel. J R, won the National Book Award for the best
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novel of 1975 and critical journals have devoted special issues to him-in
1977, The Hollins Critic; in 1982, The Review of Contemporary Fiction. Soon
Ferman Bishop's William Gaddis will become a part of the Twayne United
States Authors Series.
It would seem, then, that now, twenty-seven years after the publication of
The Recognitions, the time is propitious for Steven Moore's study, about
which John W. Aldridge stated in a reader's report, "I believe that Mr.
Moore has indeed made a contribution to the field and that the subject is indeed important. . Mr. Moore will be recognized as performing for Gaddis
a service comparable to that of the many Joyce annotators."
A Reader's Guide to William Gaddis's "The Recognitions" consists of seven sections: Preface, Introduction, Annotations, Appendix A, Appendix B, Bibliography, Index. Even the less crucial of these should prove useful to scholars.
For example, in Appendix A, Moore has reprinted three nonfiction pieces
by the author "for the light they shed on various aspects of The Recognitions." Included are "a kind of prefatory note Gaddis sketched out in 1949
but .later decided not to use" (transcribed by Peter W. Koenig in his unpublished 1971 dissertation, "'Splinters from the Yew Tree'''), and two articles,
"Stop Player. Joke No.4" (Atlantic Monthly, July, 1951), "a captious investigation of ... the mechanization of the arts," and "In the Zone" (New York
Times, March 13, 1978), "Gaddis's own memoir of his days in Central America, written thirty years later." Helpful too are Appendix B, which juxtaposes the many inaccuracies in the available but corrupt Avon edition (1974)
with the accurate wording of the unavailable but authoritative Meridian
edition (1962), and the annotated Bibliography, which lists dissertations as
well as domestic and foreign criticism.
The indispensable introductory section consists of two parts, an analysis
and a synopsis of The Recognitions. Though excerpted from a longer essay
that may form the basis of another study, the analysis augments Gaddis
commentary significantly, for it focuses on "the immense structural design"
underpinning the author's encyclopedic master-work. His remark, "Nothing is actually valid; (circumstances) exist only in their Symbolic usage," has
influenced Moore, who views The Recognitions as "an account of personal integration amid collective disintegration." The protagonist's "quest for authenticity in life and art" becomes more psychological than physical, so that
"much of the novel's symbolism is a projection of latent contents in Wyatt's
unconscious." Moore, contrary to most critics, sees this quest as a return to
the lost and dishonored mother instead of to the father, since "the integration of the personality. . can result only from an acknowledgment of the
supremecy (sic) of the White Goddess." In The Recognitions, which was influenced by C. G. Jung as well as by Robert Graves, Wyatt must confront and
accept his anima, or the emotional, intuitive, irrational distaff elements of
the male psyche. The symbolic system involved contains three main image
clusters - nocturnal; lunar; marine-"associated in myth and modern psychology with both the unconscious and the feminine." These clusters are
found also in the symbolic vocabulary of alchemy and alchemy constitutes
"the controlling metaphor of the entire novel." Like Jung, Gaddis identifies
alchemical experimentation with the "process of individuation/' while his
Faustian hero attempts to reconcile various oppositions: "Reverand (sic)
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Gwyon/Camilla; sun/moon; sol (gold)/luna (silver); Logos/Eros; Christianity /paganism; consciousness (rationality)/unconsciousness (irrationality);
separation/unity; activity/passivity; God (king)/Virgin (queen); day/night;
intellect/emotion." Redemption, the principal concern of alchemy, is secularized throughout The Recognitions as the "power of art," which, in turn, assumes "almost religious importance."
Entering the novel is a bewildering experience, since, Moore explains,
"far from taking the reader by the hand as would a Fielding or a Thackeray,
Gaddis often abandons the reader at the various scenes of action to overhear
the confused gropings, deliberate lies, and mistaken notions of the characters." Indeed, the book's "labyrinthine plot ... requires several close readings just to understand what is going on," and consequently errors of fact
have flawed nearly all the reviews and critical essays. We should be most
grateful, then, for a correct and concise summary that will make The Recognitions more accessible to students of serious fiction. The synopsis lists both
Meridian and Avon pagination and incorporates an invaluable time-scheme
drawn from Moore's "Chronological Difficulties in the Novels of WiUiam
Gaddis" (Critique 22, no. 1 [1980]),79-91).
Even after the reader has untangled the plot, he or she is faced with a welter of abstruse information-"literary allusions, books titles, historical references, obscure subjects, hagiographies, details from church history,
mythology, and anthropology, foreign phrases in over a half-dozen languages." The Annotations section addresses this problem; and the fact that it
occupies 246 of 337 pages confirms it as the pivotal segment of A Reader's
Guide to William Gaddis's "The Recognitions." These annotations, complete except for a few unidentified sources, represent an impressive scholarly
achievement, as they embrace a range of erudition probably unmatched by
any previous American novel, including Moby Dick, whose size, difficulty,
and fate resemble the later volume's. Working without the aid of the author
and only minimal assistance from dissertations (and translators), Moore uncovered "the remaining sources, other than those named in The Recognitions"
to provide the materials needed for intelligent assessment. The titles cited
on pp. 54-58 reveal some of Gaddis's concerns while composing his book:
Architecture, Mysticism and Myth; The Apocryphal New Testament; Fox's Book of
Martyrs; Counterfeiting: Crime against the People; The Devil's Share; Encyclopaedia
Britannica, 14th ed.; Faust: A Tragedy; The Gentle Art of Faking; The Golden
Bough; How to Win Friends and Influence PeQple; The Divine Comedy; Lives and
Opinions of Eminent Philosophers; Love in the Western World; Mithraism; Magic
and Religion; The Malleus Maleficarum; Magic, Myth and Morals: A Study of
Christian Origins; Mediaeval and Modern Saints and Miracles; Psychology and Alchemy; The Pilgrim Hymnal; The Physical Phenomena of Mysticism; Star Lore of
All Ages; The Van Eycks and Their Followers; The White Goddess; A Historical
Grammar of Poetic Myth; The Walling of the Middles Ages.
Like Ulysses, Filmegans Wake, The Waste Land, and The Can/os, The RecoSlIitions is one of those modern works that demand and deserve the kind of
treatment rendered by Steven Moore. "Demand" because of their complex
nature; "deserve" because of their undeniable stature. Just as Moore is to be
praised for successfully finishing an arduous task, the University of Nebraska Press is to be congratulated on the vision required to publish his
splendid book.
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A Reader's Guide to William Gaddis's "The Recognitions" affirms what some of
us have known all along-that the author of this great novel will inevitably
playa major role in the history of American letters.
New York University

John Kuehl

